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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the continuing challenges for American marital property law in the
twenty-first century, broadly understood, is what to do about property disputes
between domestic partners who are not married.1 More precisely, the challenge
is determining what to do when there are property disputes between unmarried
intimate partners, whether heterosexual or homosexual.2 From what I can tell,
this is as much of a challenge in Texas as it is in the rest of the country.3
In the northwest corner of the country, we have a set of attitudes that, like
many social and cultural norms, have found their way into our common law.
These northwestern attitudes might not be so common, or at least so commonly
understood, in Texas. Thus, the purpose of this article is to describe how my
Blue State of Washington handles property disputes between domestic partners,
as well as to discuss what Texas might be able to take from a Blue State
approach.'
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
1. See, e.g., C. Luke Gunnstaks, 21st Century Issues Dealing with Nontraditional Relationships:
Dividing Property Between Unmarried Persons, ST. B. TEX., 33RD ANNUAL ADVANCED FAMILY LAW
COURSE (Aug. 6-9, 2007), http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/6367/38738.htm; Mary Bonauto et
al., Property Division Issues in Non-Marital Relationships, GLAD, http://www.glad.org/rights/publications/
c/relationships (last updated Dec. 1, 2008); Andy Sirkin, Home Ownership for Domestic Partners and
Unmarried Couples, SIRKINLAW (Oct. 3,2011), http://www.andysirkin.com/ HTMLArticle.cfm?Article=4.
2. See Gunnstaks, supra note 1; Bonauto et al., supra note 1.
3. See Gunnstaks, supra note 1; Bonauto et al., supra note 1; see also About Domestic Partnerships,
LAW OFFICE OF ERIC L. FREDRICKSON, http://www.houstondivorcelawfTirm.com/Divorce/Domestic-
Partnerships.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
4. See Bonauto et al., supra note 1. If there are any readers not familiar with the distinction between
blue states and red states, it narrowly denotes a distinction between Democratic (blue states) and Republican
(red states) voting patterns. See, e.g., Red States and Blue States, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wikilRed States and blue-states (last visited Feb. 11, 2014)
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II. TEXAS AND UNMARRIED INTIMATE PARTNERS
I begin, with some diffidence, by describing what I take to be the Texas
law regarding disputes over property held by parties in committed intimate
relationships-diffident because I am writing for a Texas readership, who will
quickly see the shortcomings in my attempt to understand their state's legal
turf. To forestall any immediate sense of outrage on the part of my readers, let
me begin by quoting from § 21.5 of the Texas Practice Series on Marital
Property and Homesteads, which, at least in part, states as follows:
In a meretricious relationship, each party is entitled to the property
acquired during the relationship in proportion to the value that his or her
labor contributed to its acquisition. Parties to a meretricious relationship are
entitled to the share of the property contributed by them as a "vartner" or
contributor to the enterprise, but not because of the relationship.
Section 21.5 goes on to explain that the parties to a meretricious relationship
can evade the foregoing result by trying to establish that they were informally
6married, pursuant to a common law marriage. Thus, before addressing
relationships that do not qualify as informal marriages, it is necessary to briefly
discuss common law marriage in Texas.
Texas is distinct because it is the only community property state that still
allows common law marriages.8 The Texas Family Code states that, to enter
into such a marriage, it is only necessary that "the man and woman agreed to be
married[,] and after the agreement[,] they lived together in this state as husband
and wife and there represented to others that they were married.9 But the Texas
Practice Series on Marital Property and Homesteads makes clear that there is a
lot implicit in the term "only."' 0 "Proving an informal marriage is extremely
difficult."" The Texas Family Code sets out different requirements to establish
such marriage, and parties must satisfy each for their informal marriage to be
5. 39 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE: MARITAL PROPERTY AND HOMESTEADS § 21.5 (1993
& Gerry W. Beyer, Supp. 2013) [hereinafter LEOPOLD].
6. See id.
7. See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
8. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2006); 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 43 (West 2013). The
statement in the text needs to be qualified to this extent: Idaho was the last of the remaining community
property states to abolish common law marriage and did so in 1995, effective in 1996. But Idaho continues to
respect common law marriages that were validly contracted before that date: "The provisions ofsubsection (1)
of . .. section [32-201] requiring the issuance of a license and a solemnization shall not invalidate any
marriage contract in effect prior to January 1, 1996, created by consenting parties through a mutual
assumption of marital rights, duties or obligations." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-201(2) (West 2006). It should
also be noted that states that do not, themselves, allow common law marriages will still respect these
marriages if they are validly contracted elsewhere. See, e.g., In re Gallagher's Estate, 213 P.2d 621, 623
(Wash. 1950) (citing Willey v. Willey, 60 P. 145, 146 (Wash. 1990)).
9. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2).
10. See LEOPOLD, supra note 5.
11. Id.
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lawfully recognized.12 First, in Texas, to have a valid common law marriage,
the couple must consist of a man and a woman, thus ruling out common law
marriage between gay partners, of which there may be almost 50,000 living in
Texas.13 Next, the couple must have agreed to be married.14 Today, many
intimate couples are quite certain that, even if one partner wants to get married,
both partners have not actually agreed to be married; as such, the couple would
fail to meet the first element of this requirement.15 Additionally, even if a
couple agrees to be married and lives together "as husband and wife," if others
do not recognize the partners as married, then there is no common law
marriage. For example, in Small v. McMaster, the court rejected a claim to
establish a common law marriage because the couple had not sufficiently
represented to others that they were married:
Whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that a couple held
themselves out as husband and wife turns on whether the couple had a
reputation in the community for being married.....
... [S]tanding alone, occasional references to each other as "husband"
and "wife" and the like are insufficient to establish an informal marriage.
Further, the element of presenting to others requires both parties to have
represented themselves as married. 17
Thus, while the availability of common law marriage in Texas may provide
some property relief for couples who have not had a ceremonial marriage, it
does not go so far as to address the growing phenomenon of intimate partners
who knowingly choose to live together outside the institution of marriage, let
alone the plight of gay couples who have no choice but to live outside the
institution of marriage in the State of Texas.' 8
12. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401; see also infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
13. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401; see also ADAM P. ROMERO ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., CENSUS
SNAPSHOT: TEXAS 1 (2008), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/ Texas
Census2000Snapshot. pdf (indicating that the number 50,000 is based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau).
This requirement of the informal marriage statute is, of course, mandated by the Texas Constitution, and it is
also in accord with other statutes. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; see also e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau figures, by 2005, there were "almost 50,000 same-sex couples living in
Texas.... [and] 20% of [these] same-sex couples ... [were] raising children." ROMERO ET AL., supra.
14. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2); see also LEOPOLD, supra note 5. "To establish this
element of common-law marriage, the evidence must show the parties intended to have a present, immediate,
and permanent marital relationship and that they did in fact agree to be husband and wife." Eris v. Phares, 39
S.W.3d 708, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
15. See LEOPOLD, supra note 5.
16. See id.; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401.
17. Small v. McMaster, 352 S.W.3d 280, 285 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Eris, 39 S.W.3d at 716-17 (finding sufficient evidence of an
agreement to marry, but insufficient evidence of holding out); Knight v. Volkart-Knight, No. 13-00-514-CV,
2001 WL 892250, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 19, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(finding insufficient evidence of holding out).
18. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
3
4 ESTATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWJOURNAL
Returning to the language of § 21.5 of the Texas Practice Series on
Marital Property and Homesteads, it is important to reiterate that property can
be shared between unmarried partners "in proportion to the value that his or her
labor contributed to its acquisition. Parties to a meretricious relationship are
entitled to the share of the property contributed by them as a 'partner' or
contributor to the enterprise, but not because of the relationship."l 9 Before
going any further, however, to adopt consistent terminology and to rid ourselves
of the adjective "meretricious," I will use the phrase "committed intimate
relationship" (CIR) to refer to these relationships throughout the remainder of
this article.2 0 Hopefully, this change in terminology will not lead me too far
astray in understanding Texas law-perhaps it might even encourage Texas to
change its terminology. 21
The first, and quite possibly the most intriguing, thing stated in § 21.5 of
the Texas Practice Series on Marital Property and Homesteads is that property
acquired during a CIR can be divided "in proportion to the value that his or her
labor contributed to its acquisition."22 Interestingly, the only Texas case cited
for this proposition is a 1909 case, Hayworth v. Williams.23 According to the
facts of the case, "[i]n 1859[,] Thomas Jefferson, . . . a married man[,] ...
living in the state of Pennsylvania, entered into a marriage, in form, with
Margreth Williams, who, at the time, knew that Jefferson was" still lawfully
married to another woman.24 Jefferson and Williams moved to Louisiana and
then, in 1880, they moved to Texas, where Jefferson purchased a piece of land
with cash. 25 While Jefferson did not stay around long-he eventually moved
back to Louisiana-he would return from time to time, for brief visits. 2 6
Margreth stayed in Texas with their children until 1905.27 At that point,
Jefferson apparently grew nervous about his title to the land, so he brought suit
to quiet title; Margreth, on the other hand, seemed to think she acquired the
land by adverse possession.28 Before the suit was completed, however,
Jefferson died.29 While Margreth ultimately lost her adverse possession claim,
she had an alternative theory: she argued that she was "entitled to an interest in
19. LEOPOLD, supra note 5.
20. The term "meretricious" is an adjective that derives from the Latin word for prostitute (meretrix) and
offends many committed partners. In Washington, the term has been replaced with the phrase adopted in this
article: committed intimate relationship. See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 350 n. 1 (Wash. 2007) ("While
this court has previously referred to such relationships as 'meretricious,' we, like the Court of Appeals,
recognize the term's negative connotation. Accordingly, we too substitute the term 'committed intimate
relationship,' which accurately describes the status of the parties and is less derogatory.").
21. See supra text accompanying note 20.
22. LEOPOLD, supra note 5.
23. Hayworth v. Williams, 116 S.W. 43, 46 (Tex. 1909).
24. Id. at 44.
25. See id.
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the property because she [had] contributed to its acquisition." 30 The court
found as follows:
The records show that in 1880 the land in suit was conveyed by deed
regularly executed to Thomas Jefferson for a recited cash consideration,
acknowledged to have been paid by him at the time. Margreth Williams'
right in this property is a question of fact to be submitted to the jury under
proper instructions. If Margreth Williams can show that the money with
which the land was purchased was acquired in whole or in part by her labor
in connection with Thomas Jefferson before the time when the land was
purchased, then she would be entitled to a share in the land in the proportion
that her labor contributed in producing the purchase money. Nothing which
she did contributing to the improvement of the property or otherwise in
connection with Thomas Jefferson after the deed was made and the landpaid
for can affect the title. Her right must have existed in the fund which
purchased the land, and no trust in favor of Margreth Williams will arise out
of the dealings between her and Jefferson after the title had vested in him.
It is not necessary that Margreth Williams should prove that she
produced by her labor apart ofthe very money that was used in purchasing
the land. If she and Thomas Jefferson were working together to a common
purpose, and the proceeds of labor performed by them became the joint
property of the two, then she would occupy the position that a man would
have occupied in relation to Thomas Jefferson under the same
circumstances; each would own the property acquired in proportion to the
value of his labor contributed to the acquisition of it.3 1
The right to an interest, if any, arose not from Margreth's status as Jefferson's
domestic partner, but from actual labor contributed to its acquisition.32 The
court sounds a very promising note when it says that Margreth need not show
"that she produced by her labor a part of the very money ... used in purchasing
the land[,]" so long as she can show they "were working together to a common
purpose, and the proceeds of labor performed by them became the joint
property of the two[.]"' But unfortunately, the court does not elaborate on
what it might mean by this statement.34
As might be supposed, the Hayworth case has seen some action since it
was decided in 1909.35 In a 1954 case, Hyman v. Hyman, the appellate court
relied on the general principle in Hayworth and determined that "[t]he trial
court's finding that appellant did not enter into the marriage with appellee in
30. Id.
31. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
32. See id
33. Id at 46. The court notes that Margreth would have the same rights "that a man would have
occupied in relation to Thomas Jefferson under the same circumstances[,]" which is also promising for same-
sex partners. Id
34. See id.
35. See infra notes 36-68 and accompanying text.
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good faith [was] not conclusive as to her rights in and to the property acquired
during the relationship of the parties." The court in Hyman also drew support
from a 1943 case, Cluck v. Sheets, a case in which the Supreme Court of Texas
found that the evidence supported the finding of an express trust for the
division of land.37 The Hyman court remanded the case for a trial on the
question of an express agreement, noting that the pleadings and the evidence
"raise[d] the issue of an agreement between the parties as to the joint
accumulation of property and that appellee held all property so accumulated in
trust for appellant as to her interest therein."38
Hayworth, however, had almost no traction in Meador v. Ivy, a 1965 case
decided by the appellate court in San Antonio.39 In Meador, the evidence
indicated that Meador and Ivy did not have any assets when they began living
together; that they spent their years together buying, refurbishing, and selling
second-hand mobile homes; and that Ivy had actively done "much of the actual
painting and repairing of the . . . trailers, particularly in the last few years when
Meador's health declined."40 Nonetheless, the court denied Ivy any share of the
assets accumulated in Meador's name because not only had Ivy not alleged or
presented evidence of an actual agreement between she and Meador to be
partners, but Ivy had also not alleged or presented evidence to support an
express trust; additionally, Ivy admitted that she and Meador knew they were
not in a putative marriage relationship. 4 1 The court in Meador stated as
follows:
The distinction between the rights of a putative wife and a 'pretended'
wife is set forth in Lawson v. Lawson[.] The Court recognized the rights of a
putative wife to share in the property accumulated by the couple during th[e]
relationship [but] said: ' . . . the rule does not apply to cases such as this, and
now the courts refuse to award anything to a pretended wife, who, by reason
of her knowledge of the illicit relation, occupies the position of an adulteress
and a breaker of the laws. In such cases the courts will leave the parties as
they find them, on the same principle that they refuse to enforce any other
contract which by reason of its objects, or the nature of the consideration
upon which it rests, is violative of law or against public policy.' 42
In Meador, the Hayworth decision merited only a "cf." for the proposition that
Ivy had conceded she and Meador were not in a putative marriage
relationship.43 While the Meador court could have looked to Hayworth, a 1909
36. Hyman v. Hyman, 275 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1954, writ refrd n.r.e.).
37. See id.; see also Cluck v. Sheets, 171 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1943).
38. Hyman, 275 S.W.2d at 151.
39. See Meador v. Ivy, 390 S.W.2d 391, 391-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, no writ).
40. Id. at 393.
41. See id. at 393-94.
42. Id. at 394 (quoting Lawson v. Lawson, 69 S.W. 246, 247 (Galveston 1902, writ ref d)).
43. See id "Cf." is used to indicate that "[ciited authority supports a proposition different from the
main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support. Literally, 'cf' means 'compare."' THE
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Supreme Court of Texas case, as potential support of a property award based on
actual proof that Ivy had contributed directly to the acquisition of the assets in
question, the court in Meador neither mentioned nor discussed this possibility;
instead, the court gave deference to Lawson, a 1902 court of civil appeals case,
which dealt with a putative marriage rather than a non-putative marriage.
In Faglie v. Williams, a case decided in 1978, the court of appeals, in
relying on the foregoing cases, noted the following:
The courts of this state have invoked the doctrines of express and resulting
trusts in vesting title to property in a woman who lived with a man and
accumulated real property in conjunction with him when there was neither a
ceremonial nor a common law marriage, nor a putative marriage.45
But Faglie went on to conclude that the evidence presented at trial did not
support any of these legal theories:
No rights in the property flow from appellant's meretricious relationship
with Mike Williams, without proof of an express trust, or a resulting trust in
her favor, or existence of a partnership. In the absence of proof of one of
these three theories, the courts refuse to award anything to a pretended wife
who knows the nature of the relationship.46
Perhaps more to the point, in 1982, in Small v. Harper, the court of
appeals relied upon Hayworth and Cluck and reversed the trial court's granting
of summaryjudgment against Small, when she attempted to secure a portion of
the lands she acquired with Harper.47 Small presented evidence that they had
been in a lesbian relationship for at least twelve years and alleged theories of
oral partnership, joint venture, resulting trust, and constructive trust.48
While the lesbian relationship of the parties, if such it be as described by
the appellant, could present this court with a novel question-i.e. the property
rights of heterosexuals vis-a-vis the property rights of homosexuals-it is our
opinion that such question is not controlling in the instant case because of the
way contributions of work and capital were made and because of the way
properties were jointly acquired, generally, but not always, in the names of
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 55 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th
ed. 2010).
44. See Meador, 390 S.W.2d at 394. In Texas, a putative marriage is one in which partners marry one
another, in ignorance of the fact that one of the partners is not legally entitled to marry and so believe, in good
faith, that the are legally married. See LEOPOLD, supra note 5, § 21.2. "[W]e think it should be taken as the
settled doctrine in this state that, in case of a marriage of the character of that in controversy, the putative wife,
so long as she acts innocently, has, as to the property acquired during that time, the rights of a lawful wife."
Barkley v. Dumke, 87 S.W. 1147, 1148 (Tex. 1905).
45. Faglie v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 557, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. Id. (citing Lawson, 69 S.W. at 247).
47. See Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. See id at 25-27.
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both of the parties. We come now as squarely to grips with the homosexual
and/or lesbian aspects of this case as our judicial needs require.
Based on. . .explanations [found in Hayworth and Cluck], we hold that
there are no public policy considerations of the State of Texas that would
prevent the appellant from recovering on the claims she has made.49
Although not a same-sex marriage case, Harrington v. Harrington adds
additional support to the possibility of an oral partnership.50 In Harrington, a
divorce proceeding, the wife argued that the house she and her husband
acquired two years prior to their marriage was their joint property.5 ' The trial
court found as follows:
[T]he parties agreed that title to the property would be taken in the appellant's
name, at appellant's suggestion, for credit purposes and convenience only, but
intended the residence to be owned, used, and enjoyed jointly. The parties
expended labor and money in improvements to the home and planned to use
the appellee's separate property funds to remodel the home....
The trial court concluded that the parties entered into an oral
partnership/joint venture to own and occupy the home ... jointly; that they
took title to the home in appellant's name for convenience and credit
purposes only; and that the parties owned the home as tenants in common.52
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to
support the verdict of the trial court.53
A 2005 case, Kitchen v. Frusher, brought another legal theory forward.54
In this case, Kitchen moved in with Frusher in 2000, and three months later,
they were engaged.5 5 Frusher opened a Curves health club the following
spring.56 For the next two years, both Frusher and Kitchen managed the club.57
At times, however, while Frusher was out of town, Kitchen would manage the
club alone. During this time, Kitchen was not paid a salary, but both Kitchen
and Frusher paid their personal expenses out of the club's operating account. 9
There was no limit placed on Kitchen's withdrawals.60 In June 2003, their
relationship ended, and Frusher kicked Kitchen out of his house and removed
49. Id. at 27-28; see also In re Marriage of Braddock, 64 S.W.3d 581, 587 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2001, no pet.) (finding a constructive trust between partners who were unmarried at the time).
50. See Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
51. Id. at 723.
52. Id. at 723-24.
53. Id. at 725.
54. See Kitchen v. Frusher, 181 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
55. Id at 470-71.
56. Id at 471.
57. Id
58. Id at 471-72.
59. Id at 471.
60. Id
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her from the business. 6 1 Kitchen sued Frusher, alleging "that the business was
a partnership and that Frusher breached the agreement by excluding her from
the business. Alternatively, Kitchen alleged a claim for quantum meruit for the
value of her services working at the club"; before trial, however, Kitchen
dropped the partnership theory.62 At trial, the jury concluded that, while
Kitchen had performed compensable labor at the club, the value of that labor
was zero.63 On appeal, the court concluded that the jury's zero value finding
for Kitchen's services was without a factual foundation and remanded the case
for a new trial. 4 This case is just another indication that there may still be life
in the Hayworth case, in the form of a quantum meruit claim.65 Interestingly,
however, the court in Kitchen did not cite to, or rely upon, the Hayworth
decision or any of the other cases mentioned above, for any purpose.
Furthermore, the Kitchen court was quite careful to distinguish this case from
those cases involving household-related services:
Frusher asserts that the fact that persons are living in the same household
creates a presumption that services are gratuitous[.] ... These cases involve
household-related services, not running an outside business. Further, . . .
"where persons are living together as one household, services performed for
each other are presumed to be gratuitous, and an express contract for
remuneration must be shown or that circumstances existed showin a
reasonable and proper expectation that there would be compensation."
The foregoing cases, when read with other cases, suggest that, in Texas,
the following legal theories are available to partners in CIRs who want a share
of the assets accumulated during their relationship: (a) tracing of the partner's
labor to the extent that it, or its proceeds, contributed to the purchase price;
(b) an express trust; (c) a resulting trust; (d) a constructive trust; (e) a
partnership; (f) a joint venture; (g) an express agreement; and (h) quantum
meruit.68 There is no doubt that several of these theories are interconnected,
61. Id. at 472.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. Id. at 476, 478.
65. See id. at 476-77; see also supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (discussing Hayworth).
66. See Kitchen, 181 S.W.3d at 476-77. The court did, however, distinguish between cases of express
agreements and those involving quantum meruit claims, in the absence of express agreements. See id.
67. Id. at 477-78 (quoting Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 638 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, no pet.)); see also Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ
denied); infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
68. Cluck v. Sheets, 171 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1943) (finding the existence of an express trust);
Hayworth v. Williams, 116 S.W. 43, 46 (Tex. 1909) (considering whether a partner had an interest in
property, based on proceeds from labor contributed to the purchase price); Hyman v. Hyman, 275 S.W.2d
149, 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (contemplating an express agreement); Kitchen,
181 S.W.3d at 476-77 (evaluating a quantum meruit claim); In re Marriage of Braddock, 64 S.W.3d 581,
586-87 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (considering whether a constructive trust existed); Harrington
v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) (discussing partnerships
and joint ventures); Faglie v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 557, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
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and many of them seem to rest on some kind of express agreement.69 One
would suppose, for example, that express trusts, partnerships, and joint ventures
are all based on some type of agreement between partners. 70 Even in Kitchen-
ostensibly a quantum meruit case-the court placed quite a bit of weight on
Kitchen's understanding that the amount she was to be compensated was
greater than the amount she had been allowed to withdraw from the club's
account.
Unfortunately, because the Texas legislature has tightened the statute of
frauds to combat palimony suits, establishing an express agreement is much
more difficult.7 2 In Zaremba v. Cliburn, the famous pianist, Van Cliburn,
prevailed over Zaremba's claim that he moved in with Van Cliburn in 1977 and
"agreed to provide services like shopping, doing the mail, paying the bills,
drafting checks, dealing with accountants, creditors and real estate agents, and
co-managing the household in exchange for a share in Cliburn's income." 7 3
Clibum relied on a 1987 amendment to the statute of frauds, requiring
"agreement[s] made on consideration of ... nonmarital conjugal cohabitation"
to be in writing.74 Zaremba argued that the court should not apply the
amendment retroactively, but the court effectively did so by holding that the
amendment "bars all unwritten palimonial agreements concerning relationships
that continued past the amendment's effective date."75  Zaremba, himself,
"allege[d] that his relationship with Cliburn continued until 1994," which was
after the statute of frauds amendment; according to the court, "If Cliburn and
Zaremba had intended this purported agreement to be enforced, they had seven
years after the amendment of the statute of frauds to memorialize it in
writing."7 6
The difficulties encountered in Zaremba are further illustrated in In re
Marriage of Sanger, an unpublished court of appeals decision, rendered two
years after the Zaremba case was dismissed. The court noted as follows:
[W]hen a meretricious relationship ends, a party only has an interest in the
property that he separately purchased and that he acquired an interest in
through an express trust, a resulting trust, or the existence of a partnership
(discussing express trusts, resulting trusts, and partnerships). But see 6 TEXAS FAMILY LAW SERVICE § 40:44
(Speer 6th ed. 1988) noting that one could argue that, without "a written agreement, disputes regarding
property and custody issues between unmarried couples cannot be resolved under theories such as quantum
meruit, constructive trust, or breach of partnership agreement. However, since the Texas Supreme Court has
not yet spoken to the issue, the possibility is not foreclosed.").
69. See cases cited supra note 68.
70. See cases cited supra note 68.
71. Kitchen, 181 S.W.3d at 476-77.
72. See Zaremba, 949 S.W.2d at 825-27.
73. Id. at 826.
74. Id. (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (b)(3) (West 2009)).
75. Zaremba, 949 S.W.2d at 827.
76. Id.
77. In re Marriage of Sanger, No. 06-99-00039-CV, 1999 WL 742607 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Sept. 24,
1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
2013] NOT SO COMMON (LAW) MARRIAGE: NOTES FROMA BLUE STATE
. . . . Normally, in meretricious relationships, "the courts will leave the
parties as they find them, on the same principle that they refuse to enforce any
other contract which by reason of its objects, or the nature of the
consideration upon which it rests, is violative of law or against public
policy."78
The court then considered each of these possible theories of recovery, despite
the fact that none of them were actually alleged, and found that the evidence
presented was insufficient to support any of them.79
On the other hand, in O'FarrillAvila v. Gonzalez, which was decided only
a year after Zaremba, the court was willing to enforce two agreements between
unmarried domestic partners, based on the partial performance exception:
When there is strong evidence of a contract and application of the Statute of
Frauds would injure the person relying on the contract and allow the other
party unearned benefit, partial performance will allow a remedy. Further,
where one party has fully performed under a contract, the Statute of Frauds
may be unavailable to the other party if he knowingly accepts the benefits and
partly performs.80
But again, the O'FarrillAvila case turned expressly on proof of any actual
agreement, so it offers little hope for a partner that cannot prove such
agreement.
Thus, the promise that Hayworth presented more than one hundred years
ago has not endured.82 While, in theory, a party to a CIR may be entitled to a
share of property accumulated during the relationship, based on contributions to
the acquisition of property, in practice, parties to CIRs have difficulty proving
this right. This is partly because agreements are seldom, if ever, formalized
and partly because contributions to property acquisition, such as those
contemplated in community property systems (i.e., pooling of labor, whether
compensated or not), are simply not recognized in Texas case law when it
comes to CIRs.84 In the last several decades, however, states such as
Washington have taken a very different path.
78. Id. at *3 (citations omitted) (quoting Lawson v. Lawson, 69 S.W. 246, 247 (Galveston 1902, writ
ref'd)).
79. Id. at *2, *4.
80. O'Farrill Avila v. Gonzalez, 974 S.W.2d 237, 246 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
81. See id. at 244-46.
82. Hayworth v. Williams, 116 S.W. 43, 45-46 (Tex. 1909).
83. See id But see, e.g., Zaremba v. Cilburn, 949 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ
denied).
84. See, e.g., Zaremba, 949 S.W.2d at 824-27, 830; see also Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24,25, 27-
28 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. See discussion infra Part 111.
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III. WASHINGTON'S EXPERIENCE WITH NON-MARITAL COMMITTED
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
Washington adopted a community property system in 1869-twenty years
prior to statehood." Unlike Texas, however, Washington abolished common
law marriage quite early.87 Since then, to receive the advantages of community
property laws, Washington couples must either formally solemnize their marital
relationship or enter into a valid common law marriage in another state.
Accompanying the foregoing requirements for the formal establishment of
a community property regime, a presumption developed-the "Creasman
presumption"-which held "that property acquired by a man and a woman not
married to each other, but living together as husband and wife, is not
community property, and, in the absence of some trust relation, belongs to the
one in whose name the legal title to the property stands."89 Nonetheless, some
common law property workarounds existed. 90 Over the years, Washington
courts have avoided using the Creasman presumption by locating alternative
legal bases for shared property, under theories similar to those recognized in
Texas: tracing, partnership, constructive trust, co-tenancy, and contract. 91
Then, in 1984, in In re Marriage of Lindsey, the Washington Supreme
Court overturned the Creasman presumption and ushered in a new equitable
doctrine for adjudicating property disputes between unmarried cohabitants.92
its place, the court established a new approach: "[W]e adopt the rule that courts
must 'examine the [committed intimate] relationship and the property
accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the property."'9 3
Because the parties in In re Marriage ofLindsey did not dispute the existence
of a long-term, marriage-like relationship, the court did not provide much
guidance for the lower courts to exercise their new equitable powers, except to
say that "we do not believe [the various criteria offered] should be adopted as a
86. Act of Dec. 2, 1869, 1869 Wash. Sess. Laws 319; see also Kelly M. Cannon, Beyond the "Black
Hole'"-A Historical Perspective on Understanding the Non-Legislative History of Washington Community
Property Law, 39 GoNz. L. REV. 7, 8 (2003). For purposes of this article, we can ignore some of the nuances
that troubled the Washington Territorial Legislature. See Cannon supra at 12-16 (citing Cyril Hill, Early
Washington Marital Property Statutes, 14 WASH. L. REV. 118 (1939)).
87. See In re McLaughlin's Estate, 30 P. 651, 657-58 (Wash. 1892).
88. See In re Gallagher's Estate, 213 P.2d 621, 623 (Wash. 1950).
89. Creasman v. Boyle, 196 P.2d 835, 838 (1948), overruled by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d
328 (Wash. 1984).
90. Jennifer L. King, Comment, First Comes Love, Then Comes Marriage? Applying Washington's
Community Property Marriage Statutes to Cohabitational Relationships, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 543,548-49
(1997) (explaining that, after the Creasman presumption was established, at the Washington appellate and
supreme court levels, courts only used it as a basis for one decision and in other decisions, they only cited to it
to draw distinctions and to show the presumption's inapplicability).
91. See In re Marriage ofLindsey, 678 P.2d at 330-31 (citing WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY
DESKBOOK §§ 2.8-.12 (Thomas R. Andrews et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003)) (listing the most common means of
avoidance, which characterize property relationships among non-marital cohabitants).
92. See id. at 331 (abandoning and overruling the Creasman presumption).
93. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wash. 1976)).
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rigid set of requirements but rather that courts should examine each case on its
facts."94 Fairly quickly, In re Marriage of Lindsey gave rise to a number of
lower court cases concerning the equitable division of property acquired during
non-marital relationships of this kind.
Before too long, however, the Washington Supreme Court felt a need to
clarify; in 1995, in Connell v. Francisco, the court explained that "[r]elevant
factors establishing a [committed intimate] relationship include, but are not
limited to: continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the
relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent
of the parties." 96 But more importantly, the court stated: "The critical focus is
on property that would have been characterized as community property had the
parties been married. This property is properly before a trial court and is
subject to a just and equitable distribution." 97 Bringing this new common law
even further into the orbit of community property law, the court went on to
explain the following:
Therefore, all property acquired during a [committed intimate] relationship is
presumed to be owned by both parties. This presumption can be rebutted.
All property considered to be owned by both parties is before the court and is
subject to a just and equitable distribution. The fact title has been taken in the
name of one of the parties does not, in itself, rebut the presumption of
common ownership.
For the purpose of dividing property at the end of a [committed
intimate] relationship, the definitions of "separate" and "community" property
found in [Washington's community property statutes] are useful[,] and we
apply them by analogy. Therefore, property owned by one of the parties prior
to the [committed intimate] relationship and property acquired during the
[committed intimate] relationship by gift, bequest, devise, or descent with the
rents, issues and profits thereof, is not before the court for division. All other
property acquired during the relationship would be presumed to be owned by
both of the parties. Furthermore, when the funds or services owned by both
parties are used to increase the equity or to maintain or increase the value of
property that would have been separate property had the couple been married,
there may arise a right of reimbursement in the "community." A court may
offset the "community's" right of reimbursement against any reciprocal
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Zion Constr., Inc. v. Gilmore, 895 P.2d 864, 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); In reMarriage of
Pearson-Maines, 855 P.2d 1210, 1213-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of Hurd, 848 P.2d 185, 195
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Foster v. Thilges, 812 P.2d 523, 526-27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage of
DeHollander, 770 P.2d 638, 641 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); W. Cmty. Bank v. Helmer, 740 P.2d 359, 360
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987); see also Warden v. Warden, 676 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (failing to
consider In re Marriage ofLindsey, despite being decided shortly thereafter).
96. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (citations omitted).
97. Id at 836.
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benefit received by the "community" for its use and enjoyment of the
individually owned property.98
After reflecting on the discussion in this article thus far, one might ask as
follows: How does this new committed intimate relationship regime differ from
common law marriage?99 Not surprisingly, the same question confronted the
Connell court.100 Here was the court's answer:
Until the Legislature, as a matter of public policy, concludes [committed
intimate] relationships are the legal equivalent to marriages, we limit the
distribution of property following a [committed intimate] relationship to
property that would have been characterized as community property had the
parties been married. This will allow the trial court to justly divide property
the couple has earned during the relationship through their efforts without
creating a common law marriage or making a decision for a couple which
they have declined to make for themselves. Any other interpretation equates
cohabitation with marriage; ignores the conscious decision by many couples
not to marry; confers benefits when few, if any, economic risks or legal
obligations are assumed; and disregards the explicit intent of the Legislature
that [§ 26.09.080 of the Revised Code of Washington] apply to property
distributions following a marriage.lo0
How does this distinction between what would have been community
property and what would have been separate property prevent this new CIR
doctrine from being the functional equivalent of common law marriage?1 02 The
key here is to understand how Washington courts are supposed to divide a
married couple's property at divorce. 03  According to § 26.09.080 of the
Revised Code of Washington, after considering what is community property
and what is separate property in the dissolution of a marriage, among other
factors, the court is instructed to divide all of the property as shall appear just
and equitable.'"0 Stated more bluntly: at divorce, Washington divorce courts
98. Id. at 836-37 (citations omitted); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.010 (West Supp. 2014)
(explaining that in Washington, unlike Texas, rents, issues, and profits from separate property are separate
property).
99. In Washington, common law marriage was abolished in 1892. See In re McLaughlin's Estate, 30 P.
651, 657-58 (Wash. 1892).
100. Connell, 898 P.2d at 835-36.
101. Id. at 836.
102. See id
103. See id. at 836-37.
104. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (West 2013).
[I]n a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of the marriage . .. the court
shall, without regard to misconduct, make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of
the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all
relevant factors including, but not limited to: (1) [t]he nature and extent of the community
property; (2) [t]he nature and extent of the separate property; (3) [t]he duration of the marriage or
domestic partnership; and (4) [t]he economic circumstances of each spouse.
Id.
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may, and do, divide both community and separate property equitably. 0 5
However, at the end of a CIR, courts may not divide separate property, unless
there is a separate legal theory on the basis of which a party can claim a share of
what would not have been community property had the couple been married. 06
That is the difference.
This may not seem like much of a difference, especially if, as is commonly
believed, Washington divorce courts do not divide up separate property, but
instead, they leave it with the separate property owner. 0 7 Yet, that is the rule,
and the legislature has not seen fit to disturb this common law development,
which was first set in motion over twenty-five years ago.108 Indeed, as is
probably well known, most recently, Washington's legislature has been more
concerned with broadening the legal rights of same-sex couples than with the
legal rights of couples who choose not to take advantage of formal status
opportunities.109 Thus, in 2008, Washington formally recognized "registered
domestic partnerships" (RDPs) between same-sex couples and between couples
with partners who are sixty-two years of age or older and gave them the same
property rights as married couples.1 0 In 2012, the Washington legislature took
the next step and legalized same-sex marriage."' Even though that legislation
was tested in Washington's referendum process, the people of the state of
Washington voted to sustain the legislature's same-sex marriage statute.112
Given that the legislature has not overturned Washington's common law
CIR doctrine, how has it fared in the courts? You be the judge. First, this




107. See, e.g., Amanda DuBois, What's Considered Separate Property in a Washington Divorce?,
DuBois CARY LAW GRP. (Sept. 5,2013), http://www.duboislaw.net/blog/2013/09/whats-considered-separate-
property-in-a-washington-divorce.shtml. Until 1949, there seems to have been a legal doctrine in Washington
to the following effect: "[S]ituations which warrant an award of one spouse's separate property to the other
spouse are [only done in] 'exceptional"' circumstances. Konzen v. Konzen, 693 P.2d 97, 101 (Wash. 1985)
(citing Bodine v. Bodine, 207 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Wash. 1949)). But the Washington Supreme Court has
suggested that this is no longer the rule, despite what the property's status may have been earlier. See id.
108. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080; Connell, 898 P.2d at 836 (explaining that, until
the legislature says differently, the division of property following a CIR is limited).
109. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030.
110. Act effective Jan. 1, 2009, ch. 6, §§ 601-23, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 53-60 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030). Among the rights thus bestowed on RDPs was, of course, community
property rights. See id
111. Act Effective Dec. 6, 2012, ch. 3, § 1, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199-200 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.04.010).
112. See November 06, 2012 General Election Results: Referendum Measure No. 74 Concerns Marriage
for Same-Sex Couples, WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Referendum-Measure-
No-74-Concems-Marriage-for-Same-Sex-Couples.html (last updated Nov. 27, 2012, 4:55 PM).
113. See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348 (Wash. 2007); Soltero v. Wimer, 150 P.3d 552 (Wash. 2007);
Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735 (Wash. 2001); In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2000);
Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 778 P.2d 1022 (Wash. 1989). One additional Washington Supreme Court case,
decided in 2005, relied on the CIR doctrine when mandating that the trial court, on remand, reconsider both
the property acquired during the CIR relationship and the marital property that the trial court had erroneously
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In 1986, Peffley-Warner, a surviving partner of a CIR, filed an appeal in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington after being
denied social security survivor's benefits by the Social Security
Administration. 114 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington dismissed Peffley-Wamer's claim, and Peffley-Warner filed an
appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.' 5 In 1988, the Ninth
Circuit entered an order certifying the issue-whether the surviving partner of a
CIR would have the same rights as a surviving spouse under Washington's law
of intestate succession-to the Washington Supreme Court." 6 The Washington
Supreme Court answered this question in the negative, holding that "a
surviving partner in a [committed intimate] relationship does not have the status
of a widow with respect to intestate devolution of the deceased partner's
personal property. The division of property following termination of an
unmarried cohabiting relationship is based on equity, contract or trust, and not
on inheritance."ll 7
In 2000, two alleged CIR cases came before the Washington Supreme
Court; after granting review of both cases, the court consolidated the two
matters into In re Marriage ofPennington.'18 In both of these cases, one of the
partners challenged the finding of the appellate court, regarding the existence of
a CIR."9 The court explained that, in determining whether a CIR existed
between the partners in each of these cases, the appellate courts should have
applied the five factors enumerated in Connell-"continuous cohabitation,
duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources
and services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties."'l 2 0 According to
the court, "[t]hese characteristic factors are neither exclusive nor
hypertechnical. Rather, these factors are meant to reach all relevant evidence
helpful in establishing whether a [committed intimate] relationship exists.' 2 '
Interestingly, the court concluded that neither of the contested relationships
qualified as a CIR:
The first relationship was between Clark Pennington and Evelyn Van
Pevenage. When they met, they were married to other people. Van Pevenage
divorced her husband shortly after she met Pennington, but Pennington stayed
married to his wife during the first five years of his relationship with Van
Pevenage. Van Pevenage wanted to get married but Pennington consistently
refused. They cohabitated in homes owned by Pennington, but there were
considered the wife's. In re Marriage of Muhammad, 108 P.3d 779, 785 (Wash. 2005). However, the
doctrine did not play a significant enough role in the case to merit further discussion. See id.
114. Peffley-Warner, 778 P.2d at 1023-24.
115. Id. at 1024.
116. Id. at 1023-24.
117. Id. at 1027 (citing In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Wash. 1984)).
118. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d at 767-69.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 769-72 (quoting Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995)).
121. Id. at 770.
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periods where they broke up and lived apart. Van Pevenage at some point
lived with another man for a brief period. Van Pevenage contributed to some
of the living expenses, but the court found no significant pooling ofresources.
Viewed as a whole, the facts did not indicate a committed intimate
relationship. The second relationship was between James Nash and Diana
Chesterfield. They lived together for four years, followed by two years of
separation and reconciliation until the relationship finally ended. The court
found that the duration of the relationship could support a finding of a
committed intimate relationship. However, Chesterfield was married to
another man for the first several years that she knew Nash, they did not hold
themselves out as married, they owned no propertyjointly, and they kept their
finances separate. The court found that the evidence regarding their mutual
intent to be in a marital-like relationship was "equivocal," and the lack of
pooling their time and efforts did not justify an equitable division of assets.122
The following year, in Vasquez v. Hawthorne, the Washington Supreme
Court considered whether the trial court had correctly granted summary
judgment in favor of a surviving partner in an alleged homosexual relationship,
on the grounds that the partners had a CIR to which the equitable division
theory applied.123 The court concluded that the trial court's grant of summary
judgment was improper because there were factual disputes regarding the
partners' personal and business relationships.12 4 The court also vacated the
appellate court's decision, a decision in which the appellate court held that,
because CIRs are marital-like and these two men could not legally be married,
the CIR doctrine could not apply.125 The supreme court said that "[e]quitable
claims are not dependent on the 'legality' of the relationship between the
parties, nor are they limited by the gender or sexual orientation of the
parties."l26 As explained in more detail below, the Vasquez decision signaled,
even if it did not squarely hold, that gay partners could take advantage of the
CIR doctrine.12 7
Notably, the Vasquez court, though it did not spend significant time
discussing the issue, found nothing inappropriate about applying the CIR
doctrine at the death of a partner, as opposed to a separation of two living
partners. 128 However, in 2007, this question came squarely before the
122. WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY DESKBOOK (Thomas R. Andrews et al. eds., 4th ed.
forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript at ch. 2-11).
123. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 736 (Wash. 2001).
124. Id at 737.
125. Id. at 736.
126. Id. at 737. One justice wrote separately to state that he thought the couple's inability to marry was
fatal to the application of the doctrine, and another justice thought the question should be left to another day.
Id. at 738-41 (Alexander, C.J., concurring) (Sanders, J., concurring).
127. See id at 737; see infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 736-38. Two of the justices were of the view that the CIR doctrine should not apply at death.
Id. at 738, 741 (Alexander, C.J., concurring) (Sanders, J., concurring). Had the majority of the court agreed
with them, it is likely that the court would have explained that to the trial court on remand, but it did not. As it
happened, this case was settled on remand, so there was no further illumination on appeal.
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Washington Supreme Court.129 In Olver v. Fowler, intimate partners, Cung Ho
and Thuy Nguyen Ho, who had been in a committed relationship for fourteen
years, were tragically and simultaneously killed in an automobile accident.'30 A
surviving passenger, whose mother had been killed in the accident and who had
filed a tort claim against Cung, protested the trial court's determination that one
half the couple's assets should be disbursed into Thuy's estate.' 3 ' The
Washington Supreme Court affirmed, and in doing so, it traced the trajectory of
its cases that laid the foundation for the CIR doctrine over the past ninety years:
By analogy to community property law, Thuy had an undivided interest in the
couple's jointly acquired property, even though it was titled in Cung's name.
The death of one or both partners does not extinguish that right; Thuy's estate
merely steps into her shoes.... Cung's heirs should have no better rights than
Cung would have, were he still alive.132
Notice that, given the workings of the Simultaneous Death Act, this case
effectively holds that a partner to a CIR can capture a share of the CIR property,
titled in the name of the survivor. 13 3 For purposes of the Simultaneous Death
Act, Cung's property was disposed of as if he had survived Thuy, while
Thuy's estate was held to contain half of their CIR property.1 3 4
Finally, in 2007, in Soltero v. Wimer, the Washington Supreme Court had
occasion to reaffirm that its CIR doctrine only allowed equitable division of
what would have been community property.13 5 In Soltero, after being in a CIR
for nine years, Wimer and Soltero broke up, and "the trial court ordered Wimer
to pay Soltero $135,000" for the value of her services, "including ... running
the household and business/social matters." 3 6 The supreme court said the
problem was that the trial court failed to identify any CIR property from which
this amount was to come.137 Because the trial court's ruling amounted to an
129. See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 350 (Wash. 2007).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 352.
132. Id. at 356. On the other hand, the court declined to answer another important question in the case:
Whether all of the joint property of partners in a CIR is subject to a community tort claim. Id at 357. Prior to
Olver, appellate courts had already applied the CIR doctrine in the context of decedents' estates. SeeNiemela
v. Adderley, No. 57900-2-1, 2007 WL 1181007, at *I (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2007); In re Estate of
Anderson, No. 14572-7-HI, 1997 WL 6984, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1997); see also John E. Wallace,
Comment, The Afterlife of the Meretricious Relationship Doctrine: Applying the Doctrine Post Mortem, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 243 (2005) (advocating for the application of the CIR doctrine at death). Here, it is
worth noting that, because the relationship between Cung and Thuy ended by simultaneous death, the court
effectively answered whether the CIR doctrine applies, regardless of who dies first. Olver, 168 P.3d at 356-
57. In a simultaneous death, each partner's property is disposed of as if that partner survived the other. Id.
133. Olver, 168 P.3d at 356-57.
134. See id.
135. See Soltero v. Wimer, 150 P.3d 552, 555 (Wash. 2007).
136. Id. at 554.
137. Id. at 556.
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order that Wimer pay some of his separate property to Soltero, it was error and
had to be reversed.'38
In the development of its CIR doctrine, these cases are the milestones set
up by the Washington Supreme Court.'39 The lower courts have not been shy
about following those milestones; as of January 2013, a Westlaw search pulled
up over seventy CIR cases in Washington appellate courts that either applied or
interpreted Connell (this figure excludes those cases that gave rise to the
supreme court decisions already discussed).14 0 Of these, only a small handful
of the opinions were published; this is, perhaps, the strongest indication that the
CIR doctrine has become settled law in Washington.141
A review of the cases shows that the appellate courts have accepted the
CIR doctrine and have run with it.142 Of the published decisions, two have
squarely applied the CIR doctrine to same-sex cases.143 Two have applied
established community property remedies to deal with the commingling of CIR
property and labor with a separate property business during the relationship. 1"
One appeals court addressed and explained when a cause of action for equitable
division under the CIR doctrine accrues; it held that a cause of action accrues
138. Id. This conclusion could be a result of imprecision or a misunderstanding by the trial court. The
trial court discovered that, during the nine-year CIR, Wimer's earnings totaled $378,000 and Soltero's
earnings totaled $162,000. Id. at 554. But as to this indisputably CIR property, the trial court stated: "An
equitable split is Mr. Wimer 70%, Ms. Soltero 30%, therefore, their individual earnings is a push." Id. This
gave the impression-perhaps accurately-that the court had already decided what the equitable split of the
CIR property should be. See id But if this was not what the trial court meant, and had the trial court, instead,
ordered Wimer to pay another $135,000 to Soltero from his CIR earnings (in addition to her $162,000 in
earnings) as an equitable share ofall of the CIR property, the Washington Supreme Court might have affirmed
the trial court or might have never taken the case in the first place. Had the trial court done so, Soltero's own
earnings of$162,000, plus $135,000 of Wimer's, would have given her 55% of all of the CIR property earned
during their relationship ($540,000)-a plausible equitable split of all of the CIR property, especially given
Wimer's greater economic prospects at the end of the relationship. See id But whether Wimer had $135,000
left from his CIR earnings is not clear from the decision. See id
139. See cases cited supra notes 89-138.
140. See, e.g., Van Allen v. Weber, No. 42169-1-11,2012 WL 6017690 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 4,2012);
Ross v. Hamilton, No. 39887-7-H, 2011 WL 1376767 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 12,2011); Niemela v. Adderley,
No. 57900-2-1, 2007 WL 1181007 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2007); Fenn & Lockwood, No. 33595-6-11,2006
WL 3629147 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2006); In re Marriage of Bostain, No. 30450-3-I, 2005 WL 1177586
(Wash. Ct. App. May 17, 2005); Vo v. Tran, No. 30007-9-II, 2003 WL 22847074 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 2,
2003); Gower v. Shinstrom, No. 49775-8-1, 2003 WL 352880 (Wash. App. Div. 1 Feb. 18, 2003);
Cunningham v. Burns, No. 47868-1-1,2002 WL 1609045 (Wash. Ct. App. July 22, 2002); Rota v. Vandver,
No. 25039-0-, 2001 WL 1521996 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001); In re Estate of Anderson, No. 14572-7-
M, 1997 WL 6984 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1997); Fletcher v. Olmstead, No. 19319-1-11, 1996 WL 734263
(Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1996).
141. See cases cited supra note 140.
142. See cases cited supra note 140.
143. See In re Long & Fregeau, 244 P.3d 26 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010); Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d
1042 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Another case worth noting is In re Goodale, which adjudicated a bankruptcy
filed by a partner who had previously been in a same-sex CIR. In re Goodale, 298 B.R. 886 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 2003). The decision makes clear that the lower court treated the couple as being in a CIR and equitably
divided their property. Id. at 888-89.
144. See Koher v. Morgan, 968 P.2d 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); Lindemann v. Lindemann, 960 P.2d
966 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
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when the CIR ends and that the action must be brought within three years from
that time: "The three-year statute of limitations applies to actions 'upon a
contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not
arise out of any written instrument."'l 4 5 In another opinion, the appellate court
applied the CIR doctrine at the death of one of the parties to the CIR and in
doing so, rejected the estate's contention that an equitable CIR claim was
subject to Washington's four-month non-claims statute that governs creditors'
claims.14 6 The court held that a CIR property claim was not a debt owed by the
estate, but rather, it was more akin to a claim by a spouse or a tenant in
common that property to which they were entitled should not be included in the
estate's inventory.14 7  Another appellate court opinion determined that
"[p]artners in a committed intimate relationship, like spouses, may change the
status of their community-like property to separate property by entering into
mutual agreements. These agreements may be oral or written."l4 8 After
deciding that there was an oral agreement between the partners to the CIR, the
court then enforced the agreement, based on the fact that the couple had abided
by this agreement throughout their relationship.14 9 The court also held that,
because it takes mutual intent to establish a CIR, "when a party to a committed
intimate relationship expresses the unequivocal intent to end the relationship,
that relationship ends."'" Other cases simply apply community property
principles to resolve CIR issues; one case held that where a CIR interest in a
state pension plan could not be divided under a qualified domestic relations
order (QDRO) (because the parties were not married), the court was entitled to
award a sum certain to the non-employee representing his CIR share.' 5'
Another case affirmed an award of 36% of the CIR property to one of the
partners, noting that equitable distribution (the standard for distributing
property at the dissolution of a married couple and at the end of a CIR) does not
mean equal division.15 2
145. In re Kelly & Moesslang, 287 P.3d 12, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.080(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2014)).
146. Witt v. Young, 275 P.3d 1218, 1221-22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
147. Id. at 1222 ("Witt's claim is better characterized as challenging the inclusion of her property in the
estate's inventory. An interested party may challenge an estate's inventory at any point of the probate
proceedings.").
148. In re G.W.-F., 285 P.3d 208, 212 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 212-15.
150. Id. at 217.
151. In re P'ship of Rhone & Butcher, 166 P.3d 1230, 1233-34 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). While it is
unclear from the opinion why the parties and the court concluded that the pension could not be divided under
a QDRO, if it was based on a concern that federal law does not permit a QDRO to divide non-marital CIR
property, that conclusion seems inconsistent with Owens v. Automotive Machinists Pension Trust. See id; see
also Owens v. Auto. Machinists Pension Trust, 551 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2009); infra note 193 and
accompanying text.
152. In re Sutton & Widner, 933 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). Interestingly, however, the
court also affirmed the trial court's reduction ofMs. Sutton's share by the rental value ofthe couple's home
because she exclusively occupied it after the CIR ended-in this regard, this distinguishes a CIR from a
marriage. Id.
2013] NOT SO COMMON (LAW) MARRIAGE: NOTES FROMA BLUE STATE
As noted, there have been a number of unpublished Washington appellate
court decisions applying the CIR doctrine.153 In many of these cases, the courts
simply apply the CIR standards and rules previously announced by the
Washington Supreme Court.' 54 Some of the unpublished decisions, however,
have dealt with unanswered or incompletely answered questions relating to
CIRs. 55 While these decisions may not be cited as precedent in Washington,
they are described to show the variety of issues that arise and the penetration of
the Connell doctrine into Washington's common law.156
May a CIR be formed even though one partner remains married and is
therefore legally unable to marry anyone else? In principle, this question was
addressed in the Vasquez case, in dictum, when the court stated that the CIR
doctrine is "not dependent on the 'legality' of the relationship between the
parties."l 57 That principle was applied in Fleming v. Spencer, a case in which
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of a CIR, notwithstanding
the fact that one of the parties was still married when the CIR commenced. 58
Will a Washington court apply the CIR doctrine to a CIR that began and
was maintained in another state before the couple moved to Washington?
153. See cases cited supra note 140.
154. See, e.g., Van Allen, 2012 WL 6017690, at *1, *5 (affirming characterization and division ofCIR
property); Ross, 2011 WL 1376767, at *7-9 (holding CIR properly found and property division was within
trial court's discretion); Niemela, 2007 WL 1181007, at * 1-2 (affirming determination that no CIR existed,
but presupposing that such a claim was viable where the matter was tried after the death ofa partner); Fenn &
Lockwood, 2006 WL 3629147, at *7-8 (holding that CIR was properly found but an item that was not CIR
property should not have been divided); In re Marriage ofBostain, 2005 WL 1177586, at *1 (affirming
determination that a CIR existed for seven years prior to a three-year marriage and affirming determination
that alleged non-marital agreement was unenforceable); Vo, 2003 WL 22847074, at * 1 (finding of a CIR prior
to marriage was proper, as was property characterization and division); Gower, 2003 WL 352880, at * 1-3
(finding ofa CIR was proper and characterization ofCIR property affirmed, based on commingling doctrine);
Cunningham, 2002 WL 1609045, at *1-6 (affirming property division in a CIR, including court's
determination that a $40,000 down payment on a key piece of CIR property was the separate property of one
of the parties); Rota, 2001 WL 1521996, at *1-3 (holding that CIR was property found and noting that the
five-factor test in Connell "requires the court to consider such factors as whether the parties have been faithful
to each other," which would not be taken into consideration in the dissolution of a marriage); In re Estate of
Anderson, 1997 WL 6984, at *2-7 (finding a CIR and that survivor was entitled to a share of enhanced value
resulting from CIR labor, but finding an abuse of discretion in valuation of CIR right of reimbursement, for
value added to one partner's separate property); Fletcher, 1996 WL 734263, at * I (affirming denial ofa CIR
and in the process, the $3.5 million award to only one of the cohabitants from a winning lottery ticket
purchased during the relationship).
155. See, e.g., Fleming v. Spencer, No. 47872-9-1, 2002 WL 171249 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2002); In re
Marriage of McCarthy, No. 30029-3-11, 2012 WL 3580059 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2012); Seven v. Stoel
Rives, LLP, No. 64117-4-1, 2010 WL 5477191 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2010); Moseley v. Mattila, No.
53497-1-1, 2005 WL 1178063 (Wash. Ct. App. May 16, 2005); Rota, 2001 WL 1521996; In re Black, No
64903-5-4, 2010 WL 2994049 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2010); Hobbs v. Bates, No. 51463-6-1, 2004 WL
1465949 (Wash. Ct. App. June 28, 2004); Meretricious Relationship of Moran v. Taylor, No. 43242-7-, 2000
WL 291143 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2000); Fletcher, 1996 WL 734263.
156. See cases cited supra note 155; see also WASH. GENERAL RULE 14.1 (West 2007) ("A party may
not cite as an authority an unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals. Unpublished opinions of the Court of
Appeals are those opinions not published in the Washington Appellate Reports.").
157. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737 (Wash. 2001).
158. Fleming, 2002 WL 171249,at *1-3.
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Apparently, yes. 159 In In re Marriage of McCarthy, the court of appeals
concluded that, in 1992, a couple entered into a CIR in Louisiana and
maintained it there for almost ten years, before moving to Washington and
getting married in 2002.160 The court applied the CIR doctrine and did not
even raise the conflict of laws issue.16'
Must litigants who claim that they were in a CIR satisfy all five of the
Connell factors to establish the validity of their CIR? Yes, according to the
appellate court in Seven v. Stoel Rives, LLP: "[C]ontinuous cohabitation,
duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources
and services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties . . . . are the
minimum requirements." 62
How will a court handle debts incurred during a CIR? Washington
follows a "community debt" system, and under this system, obligations are
classified as either separate or community from the outset of a marriage. 163 It
appears that Washington courts are generally applying the same rules to
CIRs.'64 For example, in Moseley v. Mattila, the court noted that "[d]ebt
incurred during a relationship for community-like purposes is considered
community-like debt."' 65 Similarly, in Rota v. Vandver, the court held that,
when a couple purchased property during their CIR, in part with one partner's
inheritance and in part with a bank loan acquired during their CIR, the portion
of the property they purchased with the loan was presumed to be CIR property:
"The parties covered the balance of the home with a loan acquired during the
relationship; we presume this is jointly owned property."' 6 6 On the other hand,
in In re Black, following the termination of the CIR, Einstein purchased eighty
acres in Washington and borrowed funds to pay off the purchase price.167
"Black contributed no portion of the purchase price nor did he obligate himself
on the loan." 68 The court concluded that the property was entirely Einstein's
separate property, but when it divided up their CIR assets, it required Black to
share the debt.'69 In reaching its determination, the court did not discuss the
159. See In re Marriage ofMcCarthy, 2012 WL 3580059, at *1-3.
160. See id
161. See id.
162. Seven v. Stoel Rives, LLP, No. 64117-4-, 2010 WL 5477191, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20,
2010).
163. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West Supp. 2014).
164. See, e.g., Moseley v. Mattila, No. 53497-1-1, 2005 WL 1178063, at *10 (Wash. Ct. App. May 16,
2005).
165. Id. The Moseley court also applied the "Hurd presumption," which developed in community
property cases; under the Hurd presumption, "[a] spouse's use of his or her separate funds to purchase
property in the name of the other spouse, absent any other explanation, permits a presumption that the
transaction was intended as a gift." Id. (quoting In re Marriage offHurd, 848 P.2d 185, 194 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993)). However, the Washington Supreme Court has since overruled this presumption. See In re Estate of
Borghi, 219 P.3d 932, 938 (Wash. 2009).
166. Rota v. Vandver, No. 25039-0-11, 2001 WL 1521996, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001).
167. In re Black, No. 64903-5-1, 2010 WL 2994049, at *1, *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2010).
168. Id. at *3.
169. Id. at *3-4.
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community debt doctrine; however, the court reasoned that Black should be
liable for a portion of this debt because he continued to reside on the property,
rent-free, after the couple's CIR terminated.170
If a couple has children together and they co-parent them, should this be
conclusive evidence of a CIR? In Hobbs v. Bates, Hobbs argued that the court
should follow the recommendations of the American Law Institute (ALI) in
§ 6.03 of its guidelines on domestic partners and hold this to be conclusive
evidence of a CIR.171 But the court declined to do so, finding the five-factor
test from Connell sufficient, without making child rearing a litmus test.172
Indeed, the court went on to conclude that Hobbs and Bates had not formed a
CIR because they had not pooled their resources and functioned as an economic
unit:
Because the nature of the common law claim of [committed intimate]
relationship operates primarily as a property claim, pooling of economic
resources and functioning as an economic unit is an important factor in
determining whether the parties ever intended to create a [committed
intimate] relationship whereby each party would have an interest in property
acquired during the relationship.173
Are attorney's fees available in a CIR case? Apparently not, unless some
common law fee-shifting doctrine, unrelated to CIRs, is triggered.174  In
Meretricious Relationship of Moran, the appellate court relied on two pre-
Connell cases and on Connell, itself, and determined that the statutory authority
for awarding attorney's fees in the dissolution of a marriage could not be
extended by analogy and was not applicable to CIRs. 17
Might failure to properly advise a client on the implications of the CIR
doctrine give rise to legal malpractice claims? Clearly, yes, although, to date, it
seems as though none of the malpractice cases that have reached the court of
appeals have been successful.176  In Taylor, a case decided shortly after
Connell, Taylor's lawyers advised him to settle his lawsuit with Moran, his
former CIR partner, when she sought an accounting for her share of assets in
170. Id. at *4. While this kind of result might have been justifiable under the broad equitable powers of
Washington courts at the end of a true marriage, it is arguably inconsistent with the mandate in Connell-at
the end of a CIR, separate property is not subject to division. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836-37
(Wash. 1995). If separate property is not equitably divisible, it is hard to see why separate debt should be.
See id. On the other hand, the result of In re Black may be justified based on the theory that Black owed
Einstein reimbursement for living on her separate land, rent-free. In re Black, 2010 WL 2994049, at *4.
171. Hobbs v. Bates, No. 51463-6-1, 2004 WL 1465949, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. June 28, 2004).
172. Id. at *8-9.
173. Id. at *12 (suggesting that this factor-pooling resources and functioning as an economic unit-is
more important than other factors).
174. See, e.g., Meretricious Relationship of Moran v. Taylor, No. 43242-7-1, 2000 WL 291143, at *5
(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2000).
175. Id. (citing Connell, 898 P.2d at 835-36; Foster v. Thilges, 812 P.2d 523, 527 (Wash. Ct. App.
1991); W. Cmty. Bank v. Helmer, 740 P.2d 359, 361-62 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)).
176. See, e.g., Taylor v. Goddard, No. 49164-4-1, 2002 WL 31058539 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 16,2002).
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his several companies, based on their CIR.17 7 On his lawyers' advice, "Taylor
agreed to pay [Moran] $750,000, of which $600,000 would be tax free to her,
to settle the case." 78 When the tax liability on top of this $750,000 grew to
$396,233, including approximately $162,000 in "tax on tax," Taylor sued his
lawyers for malpractice.179  Taylor's malpractice claim was thrown out on
summary judgment for failure to show breach of duty and failure to establish
proximate cause. 80 Similarly, in Seven v. Stoel Rives, LLP, Seven sued Stoel
Rives for malpractice, on the theory that they failed to advise her of the CIR
doctrine when her partner died, thus depriving her of the chance to claim an
equitable share of his estate.'8 ' But again, the court affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Stoel Rives because Seven failed to
show a triable issue with regard to all of the Connell factors.18 2
Absent the establishment of a CIR, do other legal theories for property
sharing remain viable in Washington? Presumably they do, although each must
be examined and evaluated based on its distinctive elements.'8 3 For example,
in Fletcher v. Olmstead, three years into his five-year relationship with
Fletcher, Olmstead won $3.5 million in the lottery.184 After the termination of
their CIR, Fletcher sought a share of the winnings; she relied on theories of
CIR, constructive trust, implied partnership, implied contract, and
misrepresentation. 85 Unfortunately, Fletcher failed to offer sufficient evidence
to support any of her theories, and she was denied any portion of the
winnings.186
Federal courts presiding over Washington disputes have also recognized
the CIR doctrine in several interesting contexts.'87 In Owens v. Automotive
Machinists Pension Trust, a Washington state court issued a QDRO requiring
the administrators of the Automotive Machinists Pension Trust (Automotive
Trust) to equally divide the pension benefits between the parties to a thirty-year
CR.'88 Automotive Trust argued that this was not a valid QDRO because the
parties were never legally married.'89 But the federal district court and the
177. Id. at *1.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *2; see also Meretricious Relationship ofMoran, 2000 WL 291143, at *, *3-5 (enforcing the
agreement between Taylor and Moran).
180. See Taylor, 2002 WL 31058539, at *3-8.
181. Seven v. Stoel Rives, LLP, No. 64117-4-1, 2010 WL 5477191, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20,
2010).
182. Id. at *2.
183. See id. at *5.
184. Fletcher v. Olmstead, No. 19319-1-11, 1996 WL 734263, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1996).
185. Id. at *1-4.
186. Id.
187. See infra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
188. Owens v. Auto. Machinists Pension Trust, 551 F.3d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit
used the term "quasi-marital relationship," apparently unaware that the Washington Supreme Court had
adopted the new expression, CIR. See id.
189. Id. at 143.
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Ninth Circuit both disagreed.'90 Because the order arose out of Washington's
domestic relations law and was related to marital property rights, it qualified.' 9'
Moreover, the non-employee partner, as a dependent, qualified as an "alternate
payee" under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act.19 2 The court
rejected Automotive Trust's contention that the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) precluded this result; in doing so, the court emphasized the fact that
this case did not involve a same-sex relationship.'93
In In re Goodale, a Washington state court divided property acquired by a
same-sex couple who had been in a CIR for almost twenty years.194 In doing
so, the state court awarded one of the parties, Foshay, $78,793.58 "for [his]
community property interest in a pension and a 401k fund in [Goodale's]
name."' 95 With regard to this award, the court stated the following:
[T]he court hereby clarifies for any bankruptcy court, that the ... award is
also necessary for [Mr. Foshay's] support and care and further reflects [Mr.
Foshay's] joint interest in the 401k and pension titled in Respondent's [Mr.
Foshay's] name, but accrued jointly under Washington law. As such, the
court intends such debt to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy.196
Notwithstanding the state court's intent, after Goodale declared
bankruptcy, he sought to avoid the lien against his property in the bankruptcy
court.197 Because a lien is only exempt from the bankruptcy if it secures a debt
for alimony, maintenance, or support for a spouse or former spouse, Goodale
190. Id. at 1142, 1147.
191. Id. at 1146.
192. Id at 1146-47.
193. Id. at 1144. Judge Noonan dissented from the court's conclusion on the narrow ground that the non-
employee partner was a former dependent, rather than a current one, and therefore, she did not qualify as an
alternate payee. Id. at 1147-48 (Noonan, J., dissenting). Two other Washington appellate court decisions
involved similar issues. See In re P'ship of Rhone & Butcher, 166 P.3d 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); In re
Rinaldi v. Bailey, No. 66029-2-1, 2012 WL 5292816 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2012). In In re Partnership of
Rhone & Butcher, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of a lump sum, in lieu of a QDRO,
because the court believed that, even in a CIR involving a heterosexual couple, a QDRO was not available.
See In re P'ship ofRhone & Butcher, 166 P.3d at 1234. In Rinaldi, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's award of a lump sum to a non-employee, same-sex CIR partner, in lieu of a QDRO, because of the
trial court's concern that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Owens might not cover a same-sex couple's CIR in
light of DOMA. See In re Rinaldi, 2012 WL 5292816, at * 1, *9. It is quite possible, however, that the
decision in In re Partnership ofRhone & Butcher has been superseded by Owens. See Owens, 551 F.3d at
1146-47.
194. See In re Goodale, 298 B.R. 886, 888 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2003).
195. Id
196. Id. at 888-89 (quoting Decree, at 6) ("Although the [s]tate [c]ourt refers in this paragraph to the
401k [fund] as being titled in Mr. Foshay's name, the findings of fact indicate that the 401kwas actuallytitled
in [Goodale's] name.").
197. Id at 889.
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succeeded.19 8 Additionally, since the couple never legally married, the
exemption provision did not apply.'99
In In re Andrus, the bankruptcy court concluded that the debtor and her
partner had been in a CIR for nine years, but their CIR did not entitle the
partner to a share of the real estate that the debtor acquired before their
relationship commenced.2 00 The partner's theory was that, during the CIR, the
debtor had executed a quitclaim deed conveying "half of the [p]roperty to him
as a gift." 201 But the court concluded that this partner had exercised undue
influence to induce the debtor to execute the deed and that the debtor had only
intended to make a gift to him if they got married, which they never did.202
Finally, it is worth noting that the ALI has not only noticed the
development of the CIR doctrine in Washington, but it has also seemed to have
been heavily influenced by it in formulating its recommendations for dealing
with property division at the end of a non-marital domestic partnership. 2 03 The
reporter's notes to § 6.03 of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
which the ALI adopted in 2000, states as follows: "A few American
jurisdictions take a status approach similar to that adopted in this section.
Washington, which has the most developed law, applies its community-
property law at the termination of stable nonmarital relationships.2 Section
6.03 defines when a domestic partnership has been established.205  Like
Connell, § 6.03 adopts a multifactor test.2 0 6  More pertinent, however, is
§ 6.04(1), which states, "Except as provided in Paragraph (3) of this section,
property is domestic-partnership property [and therefore divisible] if it would
be marital property under Chapter 4, had the domestic partners been married to
one another during the domestic-partnership period." 207 Section 6.04 goes on
to explain that, although separate property acquired during a formal, long-term
marriage may be recharacterized at the end of the marriage as marital property,
domestic-partnership property is treated differently.208 At the end of a domestic
198. Id.
199. Id. at 893. The bankruptcy court reasoned that Foshay could not qualify as a former spouse because
of DOMA. Id. But since Foshay and Goodale seem to have never married, DOMA is probably beside the
point. See id. Thus, the Supreme Court's invalidation of DOMA in June 2013 should not affect this decision.
See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding DOMA's definition of marriage
unconstitutional).
200. LeSure v. Andrus (In re Andrus), Ch. 7 Case No. 09-13123, Adv. No. 09-01264, slip op. at 4-6
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2010).
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 3.
203. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03 reporter's notes, cmt. b (2002) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES].
204. Id. ("[Alt the dissolution of [committed intimate] relationships, the court should rely on the
community-property laws to divide between the partners all property that would have been community
property had they been married." (citing Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995))).
205. See id. § 6.03.
206. See id
207. Id. § 6.04(1).
208. See §§ 4.12, 6.04(3).
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partnership, only domestic-partnership property is to be divided.209 It therefore
appears that the ALI has adopted the Connell rule, verbatim, for characterizing
and allowing division of CIR property.210 Finally, according to the ALI, absent
the presence of certain factors such as improper gifts, intentional misconduct, or
negligence by one partner or spouse, courts should divide marital property (and
therefore domestic-partnership property) equally.211 Thus, the only aspect of
the Connell rule from which the ALI has departed is the mandate that courts
divide the CIR property equitably rather than equally.212
In sum, the CIR doctrine, as recognized in 1995 in Connell, is deeply
rooted in Washington's common law.213 Given that a 2013 search indicated
that the CIR doctrine has been applied in over seventy appellate court decisions
since 1995, one must suppose that, since that same time, this doctrine has been
applied in well over one hundred trial court decisions.2 14 If one were to relate
the CIR doctrine back to the seminal case, In re Marriage ofLindsey, which
was decided 1984, it would not be surprising to find hundreds of decisions
where courts have applied this doctrine.215 While courts have applied the CIR
doctrine for quite some time, there are still a number of important, unanswered
questions about this doctrine:
For example, does the . . . doctrine create a present inchoate property
interest in the non-title-holding partner? Does a non-title-holding
[committed intimate relationship] partner have management rights over
property jointly-acquired? Does a tort claim against the non-title-holding
partner create a third party creditor's interest in the property of the title-
holding partner that was jointly-acquired? 216
Additionally, what happens if one of the partners to a CIR dies while the CIR is
otherwise ongoing and stable?217 At death, how will the equitable principles
209. See id
210. See id.; see also Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834-37 (Wash. 1995).
211. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 203, §§ 4.09-.10, 6.05.
212. See id.; see also Connell, 898 P.2d at 835.
213. See Connell, 898 P.2d at 836; see also Wallace, supra note 132, at 253-54.
214. See, e.g., supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
215. See In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984).
216. Wallace, supra note 132, at 244.
217. As discussed earlier, in Olver v. Fowler, the partners to a CIR died simultaneously, and the court
awarded each deceased partner half of all of the property that the couple accumulated during their CIR. Olver
v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 356 (2007); see also supra text accompanying notes 129-34. On appeal, the court
clearly established that CIR principles apply at death, but it provided little clarity as to what happens at the
first partner's death. See Olver, 168 P.3d at 356-57. A "vested" equitable property right in each partner to
the CIR, including the estate of the first partner who dies, seems to be logically implicit in the holding of
Olver, as it relates to simultaneous death. See id. Moreover, thus far, the principles announced by the court
seem to support such a property right, but this has not been clearly resolved. See id; see also Wallace, supra
note 132, at 244. It remains possible that the court will adopt a "support" rationale and only allow an
equitable share for a surviving partner. See Wallace, supra note 132, at 244. Moreover, the following
27
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that support the CIR doctrine play out, as to the size of any share awarded? 218
But there is every reason to suppose that these questions will be answered
through the further development of Washington's law.219 While the CIR
doctrine could be abolished by the Washington legislature overnight, there is no
indication of any initiative seeking to do that. 220
IV. DOES WASHINGTON'S COMMITTED INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP
DOCTRINE HAVE ANYTHING TO OFFER TEXAS?
Notwithstanding the court's protestations to the contrary in Connell,
Washington's CIR doctrine might seem like a reintroduction of common law
marriage in Washington. 2 2 1 To a Texas reader, this might seem to be the case,
222especially because, in Texas, separate property is not divisible at divorce.
Consequently, it could be argued that, in Washington, partners to a CIR are in
much the same posture as partners to an informal marriage in Texas. 2 2 3
Appearances here, however, could be deceptive. Even if one were to concede
that, in Washington, once a CIR is established, property is divisible in much the
same way as property is divisible upon divorce in Texas, this only tells part of
the story.224 There are many legal implications of marriage in both Washington
and Texas that do not apply to CIRs.225 First, following a CIR, there is no right
to support, as there is at divorce in both Texas and Washington.22 6 Second, in
Texas, as in Washington, surviving spouses have intestate succession rights;
surviving partners in a CIR do not.227 Third, in both Texas and Washington,
surviving spouses already own half the community property; surviving partners
question still remains open: at death, does an equitable share always means half, or is it subject to the
application of various equitable factors? See id
218. See generally Olver, 168 P.3d at 356-57 (awarding each deceased partner to the CIR half of all of
the property acquired during their CIR but failing to discuss whether equity might have justified a different
award had only one of the partners died).
219. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text; see also 21 KENNETH W. WEBER, WASHINGTON
PRACTICE: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW WITH FORMS § 57.15 (1997).
220. See Bills Passed in the Legislature, WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATIVE INFO. CTR.,
http://www.leg.wa.gov/LIC/Documents/Statistical%2OReports/2013_Billspassed the Legislature.pdf(last
updated Nov. 19, 2013).
221. See discussion supra Part Ill. Professor Goldberg seems to think so. See Charlotte K. Goldberg,
The Schemes ofAdventuresses: The Abolition and Revival ofCommon-Law Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 483, 528-29 (2007).
222. See LEOPOLD, supra note 5, § 20.11.
223. See Kathryn Vaughn, Comment, The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal Marriage Statute:
Limitation ofAbolition ofCommon-Law Marriage?, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 1131, 1150 (1991).
224. See id at 1161; see also discussion supra Parts I1-11.
225. See discussion supra Parts 11-111; see also Vaughn, supra note 223.
226. See discussion supra Parts 11-111; see also Vaughn, supra note 223, at 1161-62.
227. See discussion supra Parts II-11. It clearly follows from Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, that surviving
CIR partners are not entitled to social security survivors' benefits. Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 778 P.2d 1022
(Wash. 1989). Indeed, this was the impetus for certification of the question answered in the case. See id It
seems also to follow that survivors of a CIR also would not be eligible for state homestead rights, because
these turn on marriage or parentage. See id.
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to a CIR, however, only have an equitable claim to a share of the decedent's
property.228 Fourth, there are many non-property related rights and duties
associated with marriage, which are not present in a CIR.229
It is also clear that the test for a CIR is quite different-less demanding
and less formalistic-than the test for a common law marriage. 2 30 To prove the
existence of a CIR, a couple need not show an agreement to marry or hold itself
out as married, as would be required for a Texas common law marriage.231
Indeed, this is one of the appeals of the CIR doctrine because it accommodates
the fact that many couples in this day and age have deliberately chosen not to
marry, even while agreeing explicitly or implicitly to share acquisitions.23 2 As
noted earlier, whether all the Connell factors must be satisfied remains an open
question; but even if they do, the Connell factors are more flexible and nuanced
than those required in Texas (and other places) to establish a common-law
233marriage.23 Additionally, the CIR doctrine does not require an express
234
agreement to share property. Although the factors that are dispositive
(continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the
relationship, pooling of resources and services forjoint projects, and the intent
of the parties) may go a long way towards establishing the foundation for an
235"implied" agreement, the court has not made that a prerequisite.
This is not to say that the showing required to establish the existence of a
CIR is necessarily straightforward or easily met. In Pennington, the court noted
that, in evaluating whether a CIR exists, the five factors for consideration "are
neither exclusive nor hypertechnical. Rather, these factors are meant to reach all
relevant evidence helpful in establishing whether a [committed intimate]
relationship exists."236 But the court went on to reject the contention that a CIR
had been established in either of the two cases before it-signaling that sloppy
factual determinations and questionable CIRs would not be tolerated.23 7
Heightened judicial scrutiny may weed out frivolous cases, but it will also
increase legal costs. 23 8 Indeed, the factual determinations required by Connell's
five-factor test have induced at least one commentator to conclude that the test
228. In Olver v. Fowler, the court awarded half of the property accumulated during the CIR to each
deceased partner, but the question remains open whether this would always be the equitable share at the death
of the first partner. Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 356-57 (Wash. 2007). As noted earlier, it also remains
open whether the estate of the first CIR partner to die will capture an equitable portion of the property
onerously accumulated during the relationship, as would happen with regard to community property. Id.
229. See, e.g., Peffley- Warner, 778 P.2d at 1027.
230. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2006); see also Goldberg, supra note 221.
231. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401; see also Goldberg, supra note 221.
232. John M. Yarwood, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: Mini-DOMA States, Migratory Same-Sex
Marriage, Divorce, and a Practical Solution to Property Division, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 1364 (2009).
233. Compare Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.401 (noting difference in level of flexibility).
234. See infra text accompanying notes 257-67.
235. See, e.g., Connell, 898 P.2d at 834.
236. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (Wash. 2000).
237. Id. at 770-73.
238. See. e.g., id.
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"creates a high degree of uncertainty for parties contemplating or currently
cohabiting, for attorneys advising those parties, and for trial judges applying the
concept."23 9  The same commentator argues that the test may well be
inequitable in result, especially for couples who do not meet the
requirements.240
Nonetheless, it appears that there is room for the CIR doctrine in Texas.
As in Washington, the traditional doctrines available to unmarried intimate
partners in Texas-contract, partnership, trusts (express, constructive, and
resulting), and co-tenancy-have not really shown themselves to be up to the
task of doing justice for many modem intimate partners. 24 ' Reasonable people
may take the position that partners who want to share property rights have the
following options available to them: marrying (in states like Texas, if they are
not gay); contracting in such a way as to clarify their intention and eliminate the
need for the expenditure of scarce judicial resources in fighting over the nature
of their relationship; or making enforceable gifts inter vivos, in trust, or by
will.242 Moreover, traditional property doctrines provide for the deliberate
acquisition of joint property.243 Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that any of
these responses is adequate to deal with the social and psychological reality of
many CIRs today.
The core insight of the community property system, as I see it, is that the
marital relationship carries with it the inherent right to share labor and earnings
without regard to which partner is in the labor force at any particular time.
Labor in support of the relationship comes in many different forms; only some
types of labor carry with them compensation in the marketplace. 2 " There is an
opportunity cost when one partner stays home to raise children, does the
shopping, cooks meals, cleans the house, entertains guests, and adds value to
property either through repairs or by improvements. The couple can purchase
this kind of labor in the market, and the partner who does it could, instead, have
a job to pay for this kind of service.245 But the community property system
recognizes that doing this kind of uncompensated labor could contribute as
much, if not more, to the economic and psychological health of the marital
239. Gavin M. Parr, Comment, What is a "Meretricious Relationship"?: An Analysis of Cohabitant
Property Rights Under Connell v. Francisco, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1243, 1264 (1999). Professor Goldberg has
also advocated for a much more "streamlined version of the Washington criteria for determining whether that
committed intimate relationship exists: (1) Intimate Relationship: The length and type of relationship [and]
(2) Committed Relationship: The intertwining of financial affairs." Goldberg, supra note 221, at 536.
240. Parr, supra note 239, at 1267-68.
241. See Bonauto et al., supra note 1, at 8; see also generally In re Marriage ofPennington, 14 P.3d 764
(noting limitations on doctrines available to intimate partners). Here, I concede that justice may be in the eye
of the beholder.
242. See generally Judith T. Younger, Lovers' Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the Minimum
Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349 (2007) (describing imbalances between the options).
243. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995).
244. See id at 833.
245. See Cynthia Lee Starns, Mothers, Myths, and the Law of Divorce: One More Feminist Cast for
Partnership, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 204-05 (2006).
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partnership than having a job outside the home and bringing home a wage that
must then be expended for such services.246 The community property system
also recognizes that there are frequently power imbalances in marital
partnerships that, absent the economic-sharing principle embedded in
community property rights, will lead to economic and psychological
victimization of one partner by the other.24 7
Very little of the foregoing economic, social, and psychological reality
vanishes just because a partners are not married in the eyes of the law. 248 It is
the nature of the CIR that gives rises to the need for recognition of this kind of
shared economic enterprise, not the label "married." 24 9 Indeed, sometimes the
power imbalances are more severe when the partners in a CIR are not
married.250 One partner may lead the other on with promises of marriage or
promises of formal property sharing and never fulfill such promises.251 One can
look at this reality and say that the victimized partner only has himself to blame,
but life is more complicated than that.25 2 Blame is a double-edged sword; for
every victim who is to blame, there are people who have taken advantage of the
victim who are also blameworthy.2 53 In failing to protect the victims, we are
necessarily protecting their oppressors.
In this country, we are very attached to freedom of contract-perhaps
nowhere more strongly than in the law of domestic relations. 254 But the actual
dynamics of CIRs seem to illustrate serious flaws in the contract theory.
Many of these relationships do not involve an express agreement, other than an
agreement to live together, and even there, partners often drift into cohabitation
rather than expressly decide to do so. 2 56 What does often happen is that
promises are made and reliance on those promises is taken without any express
257
agreement. Promissory estoppel, which is expanded upon in § 90 of the
Second Restatement of Contracts, is an available theory of recovery when
express promises are made.258 But again, the evidence required to show even
an enforceable promise that induced reasonable reliance may be beyond the
246. See Connell, 898 P.2d at 834.
247. See Younger, supra note 242.
248. See Goldberg, supra note 221, at 514.
249. See id at 515.
250. See Younger, supra note 242.
251. See id.
252. See generally Goldberg, supra note 221, at 493 (describing complications of cohabitant life).
253. See id.
254. See Younger, supra note 242, at 349-51.
255. See generally Goldberg, supra note 221, at 507 (entailing flaws in the particular contract marriage).
256. See id. at 517-18.
257. See Younger, supra note 242, at 349.
258. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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ability of many partners to a CIR. 259 Reliance on conduct and relationships
often happens, even absent express promises.2 60
It is this kind of social reality that the Washington CIR doctrine intends to
address, and from what I can tell, the social reality is as much a part of the
Texas landscape as it is in Washington.261 Because of this landscape, I
encourage the Texas courts to consider expanding their equitable jurisprudence
to embrace the doctrine.26 2
Perhaps the social reality is even more severe in Texas than in Washington
because of the state's position on same-sex relationships. 263 As noted earlier, it
remains possible for same-sex couples to enter into written property sharing
agreements, to create trusts, and to execute wills. 264 But what about
situations-common in both heterosexual and homosexual relationships-
where partners are not sophisticated enough to understand the need for express
agreements and written documents? What if they are sophisticated enough to
understand, but they are not powerful enough to insist on them? The CIR
doctrine seems to be a good vehicle for addressing these social realities.265
V. CONCLUSION
Recognition of an equitable remedy such as the CIR doctrine in Texas will
not be easy.266 Indeed, in the context of same-sex relationships, it may be
impossible-a gay partner tried it in Ross v. Goldstein but was singularly
unsuccessful.26 7 The court stated the following:
In his final request for relief, Ross urges us to adopt the "marriage-like
relationship" doctrine. Arguing it is an equitable remedy not against the
public policy of the State, Ross contends this doctrine will aid the courts in
addressing the growing reality of same-sex relationships. We disagree with
Ross's position. Texas has determined that same-sex couples must address
their particular desires through other legal vehicles such as contracts or
testamentary transfers.
Ross does not argue that he is constitutionally entitled to the remedy he
seeks. He does argue, however, that his proposed equitable remedy is proper
to address a reality of life for same-sex couples, and that it is not against this
259. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.001 (West 2006); see also Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822,825
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (showing difficulties of proving reliance in a conjugal setting).
260. See Younger, supra note 242, at 349-51.
261. See, e.g., Zaremba, 949 S.W.2d at 825.
262. See discussion supra Part II.
263. See TEx. CONST. art. I, § 32 (stating that marriage is only between one man and one woman).
264. See, e.g., Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (affirming a property sharing agreement); cf Zaremba, 949 S.W.2d at 827 (implying that ifthe contract
were written it would have been valid).
265. See Goldberg, supra note 221, at 537.
266. See, e.g., Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet).
267. See id.
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State's public policy. There are two democratically approved statements of
Texas's public policy to guide our course on this question. The first is Texas
Family Code section 6.204, which states that it is contrary to the State's
public policy to recognize or give effect to a same-sex marriage or civil
union. The second, and weightier, is Article 1, section 32 of the Texas
Constitution, which states that marriage is between one man and one woman
only and no state or political subdivision of this State may create or
recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage. Our State's
public policy is unambiguous, clear, and controlling on the question of
creating a new equitable remedy akin to marriage: we may not create such a
remedy.268
The Texas statute is easier to deal with than the Texas Constitution. The
CIR doctrine is not the same as the civil union doctrine, as it has been
statutorily adopted in other states.269 Other states have enacted domestic
registered partnership statutes, rather than civil union statutes, but I mean to
make no distinction between these.270 Indeed, no state has adopted a civil union
or domestic registered partnership doctrine judicially; legislatures create the
status, and to enjoy the status, couples simply need to register their relationship
as either a civil union or a domestic partnership. 271 Arguably, that is all the
Texas statute intends to preclude, not the equitable jurisprudence of the
court.272
The Texas Constitution, however, goes even further and outlaws the
"creat[ion] or recogni[tion] of any legal status identical or similar to
,273marriage." To argue that the CIR doctrine does not recognize a status similar
274
to marriage, one would need to make a two-prong argument2. First, one
would argue that the only thing the Texas Constitution intends to preclude is
the kind of legislative status represented by civil union or domestic partnership
statutes-that is, the very kind of formal status change addressed in the
statute-using the statute as evidence of the intent of the constitutional
amendment.275 Second, one would argue that the CIR doctrine is a judicially
crafted, equitable remedy and not a recognition of a legal status. 276 While the
Ross court clearly rejected this kind of argument, the Texas Supreme Court has
268. Id. (emphasis added) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (West 2006)).
"This state recognizes that through the designation of guardians, the appointment of agents, and
the use of private contracts, persons may adequately and properly appoint guardians and arrange
rights relating to hospital visitation, property, and the entitlement to proceeds of life insurance
policies without the existence of any legal status identical or similar to marriage."
See id. (quoting H.R.J. Res. 6, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005)).
269. See infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
270. See discussion supra Part 111.
271. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204.
272. See id.
273. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32(b).
274. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
275. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204.
276. See discussion supra Part IV.
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not yet resolved this issue.277 Success of one or both of these arguments does
not seem impossible.
Regardless of whether the CIR doctrine could be made applicable to same-
sex relationships, it could still be applied to a heterosexual relationship; in
Texas, such application would be progress.278 In particular, it would provide a
tool for doing justice in those relationships that do not meet the strict
requirements for common-law marriage or for other intentional property sharing
arrangements, but which nonetheless cry out for some kind of shared property
rights.279 I think that this might be quite welcome in Texas.
277. Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
278. See discussion supra Parts IH-IV.
279. See discussion supra Part IV.
